Local policies of European cities on de-radicalisation

Anja van Heelsum

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Abstract
Intercultural relations can be energising and stimulating but can also if something goes wrong become the source of trouble. In the last ten years, several cities have been confronted with violence related to extremism. Some cities had to cope with violence by Muslim extremists (for instance the murder on Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam), and others with violence caused by anti-immigrant or extreme right movements (for instance an arson attack in mosques). Radicalisation of small groups of immigrants and autochthonous seems to lay behind these incidents. Pressured by this kind of events, some cities have developed policies to get some influence on the process behind this radicalization. In this paper we will first answer the question how the process of radicalization takes shape (1), and secondly we will show some policy alternatives that systematically intervene in the different stages of radicalization, which we have observed in cities that took part in the CLIP project (2). We will focus on Amsterdam (the Netherlands) and Kirklees (UK), as examples of cities were such policies have been developed and Terrassa (Spain) and Breda (Netherlands) as a city where less of these specific policies were developed.

1. Introduction

Radicalisation received recently quit some attention starting with newspaper reports and followed by the scientific literature. Both the radicalisation of Muslims in particular and the radicalisation of left and right wing activists, animal activists and other groups has given rise to the need to theorise about the question why people become radical and even terrorists. Some authors – not always very scientific and often to the right of the political spectrum – assume that radicalisation is something inherent to the Muslim religion. Some of this reasoning draws on the thinking of Huntington on the clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1998). Less extreme authors who follow this line point at certain streams within Islam that are inherently problematic in their value system, particularly relating to the position of women and democracy. This approach is called the value based approach (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk 2012, Vermeulen in press). Others tend to think that not Islam is the problem but there is a similar process underlies Islamic and other kinds of radicalisation; they see radicalisation as a personal process of individuals or groups – often youngsters – with social problems. This approach is called the means based approach. Some policy makers are more interested to intervene in values and others in the social problems. In the CLIP project we see a variety of policies in 31 cities. The overview report on interethnic relations in which the policies of 31 CLIP cities were analysed by Heckman & Lücken-

1 The CLIP (Cities Local Integration Policies) project was initiated by the European Foundation for Living and Working conditions; more information http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/populationandsociety/clip.htm
Klassen (2010) shows that cities prefer different philosophies and accentuate different elements they deem relevant. We will show below that it is possible to arrange the policies according to the phase in the radicalisation process that they target to interfere with.

Firstly we want to give some clarity on the terms used. Radicalisation is not the same as fundamentalism, jihadism or terrorism, though these concepts are often used interchangeably. A religious and a political element should be separately distinguished. If someone is a member of a conservative grouping among Christians of Muslims, this does not mean that he is more prone to become a radical or even a terrorist. And if someone becomes stricter in observing religious rules, this doesn’t mean that he or she is radicalising. With radicalisation (in democratic societies) we mean “a process of de-legitimisation of the political system in parts of a population, ranging from distrust to outright rejection of the political and societal system, coupled with a readiness to use undemocratic, unconstitutional means in the political process” (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy 2006). So radicalisation may have a religious element, but more importantly it has a political element. Adherers of all kinds of religious movements but also animal activists can turn radical. And religiously inspired radicalisation does not only happen among Muslims, but there are also many examples from Hindu, Christian and Jewish actors in India, Ireland and the middle east.

Terrorism on the other hand, is violent behaviour. Radicalisation concerns attitudes – something that happens only in the head of individuals – and violent or terrorist behaviour, which is visible and touchable and has direct consequences on the street. While policies that try to diminish radicalisation tendencies usually employ teachers, religious leaders and social workers, policies that deal with terrorism are the work of the police and secret services.

In the context of Islamic radicalisation the terms fundamentalism and jihadism are sometimes used. These terms refer to the religious side of views of individuals. Fundamentalism is the strict adherence of theological doctrines, often in reaction against any modernist tendencies (Marsden, 1980), while jihadism is usually associated with the “just war” usually meaning that violence becomes legitimate when Islam is under attack. But scholars of Islamic studies tend to stress that this is not a correct translation, the word jihad on itself actually means the striving to live a moral and virtuous life, spreading and defending Islam as well as fighting injustice and oppression (Esposito 2002).

2. The Radicalisation Process

The first research question of this paper is how the radicalisation process takes shape. Radicalization is a process and it takes time for people to develop radical attitudes. The radicalisation process often starts with ingroup–outgroup thinking and stereotyping known from the psychological literature (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Allport, 1954). According to the social identity theory, people feel a need to identify with a group and distinguish themselves from others to establish a positive identity. Therefore they define who belongs to their own group, the ‘ingroup’ and who doesn’t belong, that is the ‘outgroup’. And after defining the ingroup, they automatically describe it more positively than the ‘outgroup’. When the images of the ‘outgroup’ become negative we speak of stereotyping, which takes place in the heads of people, and is expressed in words.
The psychological literature stresses that people in insecure situations, who have an experience of exclusion and feel disconnected from society in general are more inclined to look for an alternative group that could be have extreme ideas. Since they feel society ignores or refuses them, they try to find others who are also frustrated about not belonging, and the process starts of defining the ‘ingroup’ as good and society in general – the ‘outgroup’ – as bad. This kind of insecurity is more often seen among youngsters than among elderly, since youngsters are in the phase of identity formation, and not yet sure where they belong.

Both in the case of right wing extremists and Muslim extremists, a subgroup can formulate opinions, like ‘society should not have allowed our exclusion’, and that ‘rules and laws in society are not sufficient’ or maybe even wrong. Normal criticism towards the existing system of rules and laws can develop into the view that one doesn’t have to obey to these laws, since they are unfair or simply wrong. The phase of de–legitimisation the political system is reached, and some individuals may take the law into their own hands. Examples of life histories of right wing extremism are reported by Linden (2009), and examples of Muslim extremists by Buijs et al (2006).

Of course it is very interesting at what point or under which circumstances the negative attitude is transformed into actual negative and violent behaviour. This turns out difficult to predict. Psychologists suggested already in 1950 that people with certain personality characteristics are more prone to loose a nuanced view towards other groups, as for instance the authoritarian personality, a type of person that is inclined to black and white thinking (Adorno et al. 1950). While a mild form of stereotyped thinking is quit common among most people, as a psychological mechanism to simplify the world is normal, a more extreme black and white reasoning is necessary to turn to violent action towards the ‘outgroup’. Other authors stress that certain negative experiences can lead to the turning point in which an individual decides that he has had enough and that the time has come for action. This negative experience is not necessarily related to the ‘outgroup’, but for instance becoming unemployed can first cause feelings of depression and then of anger, and the anger is then transferred to the ‘outgroup’. A common reasoning among right wing extremists, is that immigrants have taken their jobs, and that’s why ‘we’ don’t have work. As is usually the case in similar ‘nature–nurture’ debates, there is probably some truth in both explanations.

Slootman & Tillie (2006) have made a model on the process of radicalisation that is shown in figure 1. This model was used in their research in Amsterdam to analyse the radicalisation process of both Muslims, right wing extremists, and left wing extremists. The model shows how only a small section of the population think in an extreme way and even a smaller section is in favour of violence.

**Figure 1** The spectrum of not radical towards extremist
3. De–radicalisation policies in European Cities

The second purpose of this paper is to show systematically what kind of policy alternatives can be chosen, to intervene in the different stages of radicalization.

In figure 1 we saw that the first phase of the process of radicalisation is the moment when certain individuals step out of the large non–radicalised majority and somehow get frustrated and unhappy and become vulnerable to ingroup–outgroup thinking. Reasons for unhappiness might be bad social conditions, school drop–out and unemployment but also unhappiness about the existing stereotypes concerning immigrants. Policy intervention may target at stopping susceptible individuals from getting to this unhappy phase, or from the step from unhappiness in general to getting interested in radical ingroup–outgroup thinking. The policy interventions in this first step of the radicalisation process interfere to stop the development of a breeding ground for radicalisation. We will show examples how the four cities of our study approach this.

A second step in the radicalisation process is the step from general unhappiness to finding the ‘solution’ in religious conservatism. By searching on internet or trying to find similar thinkers, the radicalising person gets more and more convinced that being a strict Muslim is the solution to his own problems, and to many other problems in the world. For policy makers who are convinced that values are the underlying reason for radicalisation, this kind of intervention is seen as indispensable, since at the core of the radicalising thinker. Discussion usually occur about the right of authorities or the lack of right to interfere in religious issues. Municipalities deal with this in different ways. We will treat a number of policies below that interfere in step II ‘coping with religious conservatism’.

At the extreme right side of the spectrum in figure 1 we find the radicalised individual, who is ready to use violence. The policy interventions that deal with this third phase are nearer to police or secret service work than to the usual social policy work that takes place at municipalities. As we will see below, there are municipalities that see it as their task to arrange preventive work that is not directly police related for instance in localising potential terrorists in the making to avoid the extreme damage that they could cause.

Now, after having suggested three types of policy interventions related to phases in the radicalisation process, we will turn to examples of policies that we have seen in the CLIP cities in our
fieldwork. It is interesting to see that there are cities with a clear outlined policy towards de-radicalisation such as Amsterdam (the Netherlands) and Kirklees (UK), and on the other hand cities were no such policies have been developed, but in the last category some very similar activities are taking place, as the examples of Terrassa (Spain) and Breda (Netherlands) show. To give some background information on the cities, we will first elaborate on the philosophy that cities have about addressing radicalisation or not.

*The four cities philosophy about addressing radicalisation*

The reason why Amsterdam and Kirklees got involved in addressing the issue of radicalisation was that incidents took place with Muslim extremists. In Amsterdam Theo van Gogh was murdered in 2004 and Kirklees was the home to inhabitants who were involved in the London bombings in 2005. Both the Dutch and the British authorities launched a national campaign to stop the radicalisation of Muslims. Amsterdam embraced and even strengthened the national line. Interestingly Spain also experienced a terrorist attack in Madrid in 2004, but the Spanish authorities did not launch a similar campaign. The Zapatero government that was installed in Spain just after the attacks, promotes cross cultural dialogue and understanding, while at the same time enforcing laws on violent behaviour (Archick et al 2011).

Even when national policies gave direction, cities have interpreted them in their own way. Amsterdam developed a detailed philosophy with the help of the work of professor in Conflict Studies Erwin Staub ², and used the key concept of social cohesion that was already central in the Amsterdam approach (van Heelsum 2009a).

The Dutch city Breda disregarded the national policy to counter Islamic radicalisation. The line of thinking was not considered helpful in coping with problems in Muslim communities, since it was considered too negative. Breda prefers to work with a ‘diversity approach’, that is formulated only in positive terms.

In the case of Kirklees elements of the national ‘Prevent Plan’ were implemented, in which empowerment of local communities is a relevant aspect (Crawley & Crimes 2009). ‘Communities must be at the centre of the response to violent extremism. We need to ensure that we foster community

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² Staub (2005) argues that ‘humanising the other’ is a necessary step to solve (potential) conflicts. In the case of a city that copes with negative views on Muslims, he suggest to use the media to present the lives of Muslims in an understandable way, since knowledge of the groups about each other’s needs, helps to understand each other and not to fear each other. Stimulating ‘deep’ contact, starting at schools and among youngsters, but also by arranging common activities on for instance sport, business or neighbourhood.

A second manner to diminish conflicts is to promote a shared vision of a hopeful future, by dialogue between Dutch and Muslim leaders, in which the involvement of Muslim religious leaders is crucial.

Raising an inclusive and caring environment for children.

Thirdly Staub thinks that in the case of Amsterdam active involvement of members of the stereotyped minority groups in political debates helps to solve or prevent conflicts. Muslim representatives, who express the needs of the immigrant communities. Also empowerment through engagement in constructive activities can help a lot, as promoting positive leadership, helping influential individuals to take responsibility and seeing how they can exert influence by their words and actions, to move their group.
cohesion: building strong and positive relationships between people of different backgrounds, a sense of belonging and a shared vision for the future. Furthermore, strong, organised and empowered communities are better equipped to effectively reject the ideology of violent extremism, to confront and isolate apologists for terrorism, to channel legitimate grievances through democratic means and to provide support to vulnerable individuals’ (Communities and Local Government 2008).

The strategy was criticised in 2010 in parliament because it wasn’t very clear to what extent integration projects were addressing de-radicalisation (Archick et al 2011). The new ‘Prevent Plan’ in 2011 is more specific, and mentions that vulnerable individuals may become the victim of extremist organisations, particularly if they feel victim to racism and unfair treatment and that there is a lot of work that can be done by schools (Homeoffice 2011).

In Spain the national policy keeps security and integration issues separately. Spain considers the ETA a more important terrorist threat than Muslims. In the Spanish city of Terrassa (de-)radicalisation of Muslims is not directly addressed, nor Muslims in general. The city chooses the concept ‘conviviencia’ as a central theme which encompasses a peaceful living together in neighbourhoods (Van Heelsum 2009b). There is a strong belief in Terrassa that all citizens – immigrant or native – are equal and should be treated equally and therefore the policy should address all inhabitants of Terrassa in the same manner.

Policy interventions in the three phases of the radicalisation process

We will now show concrete examples of policies and projects in the four cities. As we mentioned earlier, the cities with an explicit de–radicalisation policy, Amsterdam and Kirklees, did have not chosen to intervene in the same phase of the process that we mentioned in our framework. And cities without an explicit de–radicalisation policy, have sometimes similar policies but framed more generally. We will now look at the three phases that we have distinguished one by one and show what options city administrations see to work on de–radicalisation.

Phase I Breeding ground policies

Policies to diminish the breeding ground for radicalisation are intended to intervene at the moment that children, youngsters and grown ups are still part of the non radical majority, with the intention to keep them in that category. Factors which may constitute a breeding ground for radicalisation are: a polarized society, with limited social cohesion, and considerable media attention for extreme views, combined with personal problematic situation of youngsters may cause a radicalization process. Feelings of unfair treatment, discrimination in the educational system and labour market and isolation are some of the factors that contribute. Policy makers can decide where and how they want to intervene to diminish this breeding ground. Policy interventions may for instance focus on media, on social work and on education of youngsters.

Activities that can be considered to diminish the breeding ground for radicalisation can be general and meant to improve contacts between groups. In Kirklees supporting all kinds of community organisations, keeping contacts with mosques, organising mosque open days and supporting an interfaith network are example of this. Kirklees city council finds interreligious and intercultural dialogue of high importance (Crawley & Crimes 2009).
Organising a festival with music and food during the Ramadan is another way to invite the native population to join into an important Muslim feast, and thereby to learn to know each other better. In the Netherlands a national ‘Ramadan Festival’ is organised since 2005, which included four weeks of varied programs of cultural activities and common iftars and is meant to give the native population more insight in the fasting season of Muslims, and to perceive the Ramadan period as a common celebration for all.

These activities are explicit elements of the de-radicalisation policy in Amsterdam but very similar things take place in Terrassa and Breda, differently framed. In these two cities multi-cultural festivals are framed as a way to improve good social relations in neighbourhoods and stimulate mutual understanding. In the Ca n’Anglada neighbourhood of Terrassa there is a festival on one of the squares where all kinds of (ethnic) food is exchanged and music is played.

As Staub suggested to Amsterdam, project that focus on image formation and media can diminish ingroup-outgroup thinking, since mutual understanding can increase. The city (co-)financed the production of the ‘West Side soap’, a series on the local channel about the lives of four families, one Turkish, one Moroccan, one Surinamese and one Dutch family who become neighbours and all kinds of themes pass by: love, discrimination, education, friends and work. On the one hand people should know more about each others life and culture, but it also shows how interconnected people in an arbitrary street in West Amsterdam already are. On the one hand it fits to experiences of people, on the other hand it is meant to fight prejudices, or even to treat situation that easily lead to misunderstanding in a comical way.

In the British case, the report to the Home Secretary states that public figures and politicians have a responsibility not to demonise Muslims or others, as this feeds prejudice, even though the freedom of speech remains a standing principle according to Lord Carlile (Carlile, 2011). An important element of the breeding ground for radicalisation is found to be related to experiences of discrimination and prejudice that occur in the Dutch context. One of the frustrations that youngsters reported in our interviews in Amsterdam is that they think – due to prejudice – that their chances in the educational system, on the labour market and even on the streets are much more of a problem than for Dutch. An important activity is therefore to fight discrimination (Van Heelsum 2009). Supporting the anti-discrimination office, or establishing one if there is none, is therefore very important. Amsterdam decided to actively campaign on the fact that discrimination should be reported.

In the case of the UK the laws against discrimination and in favour of equal opportunities on the labour market are probably stronger than in most European countries. The ‘Race Relations Act’ prohibits discrimination based on race or ethnicity, and the Racial and Religious Hatred Act to be able to stop hate crimes. Beside anti-discrimination ‘programs have been set up to work with young people in deprived areas and better minority access to top universities’ (Archick et al 2011:36–37). Recent budget cuts on this kind of programs worry the local councils. It strikes us that in the Kirklees report,

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3 Buijs et al. (2006) point at three factors: 1) the need for acceptance: if the subject perceives negative attitudes, he or she has problems to feel accepted by the surrounding society; 2) meaning making and 3) a sense of justice: if the subject perceives – real or unreal – dissimilar treatment for instance at school, on the labour market or by the police, his or her chances increase to become radical.
the police is mentioned a few times, while in the Dutch case the labour market was a source of frustration.

We end by mentioning that anti-discrimination policies also exist in Breda and Terrassa – but without the explicit purpose to diminish the breeding ground for radicalisation. In these two cities the problematic social situation of immigrants is also recognised as a problem, though not connected to the path into religious fanaticism and for very few cases even further into violence.

**Phase II: Coping with religious conservatism**

The second type of policy targets at conservative religious experience. Even though this is not something most authorities easily interfere with, due to the principle of division between church and state, both in Amsterdam and in Kirklees we find interventions that deal with Muslims who turn to more conservative views on Islam for the wrong reasons or without nuanced information. On its own religious conservatism is not wrong as long as it doesn’t lead to further radicalisation. This type of policies were not found in Breda and Terrassa. Generally the reasoning of the local authorities is that it is necessary to increase the resilience of Muslim communities, meaning that moderate mosques should be aware of the search that some members engage in, and provide them with enough information to be able to judge religious websites and lecturers. Elderly mosque representatives need to become aware of the type of information that young people can find on internet, and have to be able to discuss and give guidance to judge information. Resilience means that the knowledge and ability to make founded choices increases and people are not trapped into a fundamentalist movement with false arguments.

An aspect that authorities involve with in Amsterdam, is to support Muslim parents with older children who are in search of their religious and cultural identity. Welfare offices and teachers have noticed that supporting parents is very valuable and sometimes necessary, but that parents themselves do not easily come with questions to Dutch institutions. One reason is that not all staff members have an eye for cultural sensitivities and parents feel misunderstood. Another reason is that parents consider upbringing something private, and they are ashamed that their child is difficult. A (pilot) project organised in Amsterdam’s City District Slotervaart comprises of a course for parents at a secondary school in the neighbourhood directed at cultural aspects of upbringing (Slotervaart 2008: 14; Gielen 2008). The encounters showed that many parents worry a lot about upbringing related to religion; for instance how to cope with a daughter who has become extremely religious and who wants to wear not only a headscarf but a full chador, and starts to tell her parents how to behave; and how to cope with a boy that doesn’t follow any Muslim rule anymore, but no Dutch rule either. Not all parents feel capable to seriously discuss Islamic theoretical issues, and see their children drifting into an unwanted direction without being able to stop them. The course was meant to address any kind of problem that was brought forward depending on the needs of parents but a lot of issues actually had to do with religion.

Besides supporting parents, the training of teachers can improve the potential to support immigrant pupils. Teaching teachers to be open to different cultural experiences, to stimulate mutual understanding among pupils not only creates a good climate in the classroom, but also makes teachers able to recognize which boys and girls are getting lost, to understand them and to support
them. Teachers usually know kids well, and may notice that behaviour is changing and that kids might need help. Teacher also need to react on current events. When kids are angered by the TV images of Palestinians suffering, a class room discussion is possible, which can avoid overreactions and far-fetched conclusions. Of course a teacher has to distinguish which problems he can handle and for which problems he has to find the support of someone who is for instance educated in Islamic theology. If one of the students start to preach Salafi ideology, it might be more suitable to send him to someone who is knowledgeable on theological issues.

As already mentioned, Muslim associations play an important role in increasing the resilience and information level of the community and the empowerment of youngsters. They can make their members aware of the different views on Islam, provide them with information on what is orthodox and what is moderate and organise discussion on this. In general it is important to make the existing Muslim organisations stronger and to support youngsters. We usually see that a city administration cannot directly support activities with a religious content, but there is a lot of indirect effort possible.

To strengthen the Muslim communities resilience, a group of active 'high potential' youngsters was gathered from all relevant Muslim denominations in the ‘Network of Key Figures’; as we have discussed. Supporting the ‘Moslim Jongeren Amsterdam JMA’, (and thereby indirectly stimulating the network between the ‘Union of Moroccan Mosques in Amsterdam UMMAO’ de ‘Raad van Moskeeen’ (Council of Mosques) and the ‘Polder Mosque’) succeeded to a certain extend. These active youngsters also participate in many of the discussion meetings. The group received training, but as said, several proposals are currently waiting for permission, and not yet executed.

A example of a project for youngsters to increase resilience and stimulate empowerment at a personal level is the ’Socratic discussions project’ (Slotervaart, 2008: 12). This took place in the El Ouma mosque in Sloterwaart, where the special imam for youngsters led discussions for those highly interested in religious issues. Basically the imam presented all kinds of social questions and themes and asked the youngsters to reply. The central message was: be critical towards your source of information and take you responsibility as an individual in society. About 50 to 60 youngsters joined in five meetings that were organised just before the summer holiday of 2008 (Gielen 2008). The discussion leaders clarified to us that these debates are particularly useful to break black and white thinking. Example; a boy remarks: “We cannot trust the Dutch: they are against Muslims!” The discussion leader replies: “How did you conclude that”. The boy: “Haven’t you seen what they say on TV everyday?” The discussion leader: “Who did you see on TV?” The boy: “well, a politician!” The discussion leader: “One person? Who does he stand for?” The boy: “many Dutch vote for him”. The discussion leader “How many?” …. etcetera. The discussion leader experienced this as a more rewarding way of communicating than just lecturing; he explains that it is most interesting because the discussions often about values and after a while the boys really learn to reason following Islamic moral values.

Another project on personal level was an empowerment training for Muslim women, in weak position. Again the pilot ‘Training Identity and Empowerment for Muslim girls’ took place in City District Sloterwaart (Slotervaart 2008: 13; Gielen 2009). The first problem that the organisers encountered, was how to convince girls to join such training. In this case they found a group of about 16 girls – part of a larger collective of 50 to 60 – who surrounded a lady that gave orthodox lectures on Islam and advice and guidance to women. The girls were insecure about their
(Muslim/Moroccan/Dutch) identity. They used the *El Ouma mosque* and heard there about the Socratic talks and thought they could profit from similar discussions. Six out of sixteen finished the training and went through stages like – 1 – ‘turning point’ (self reflection, building up a positive self–image, improving the ability to word on ones thoughts and feelings, and solving problems), – 2 – ‘moral judgement’ (understanding how a moral judgement comes about, understanding how Dutch society developed with goals like freedom, prosperity and happiness and coping with religious dilemma’s) and – 3 – conflict management (as a girl, towards parents and brothers, towards husbands). Though relatively few girls finished the training, for the ones that got through, the effect was enormous. They were better able to think critically, they became active discussion partners at religious meetings, and they became happier with themselves, their families and their surroundings.

One of the problems that this example shows is that it is extremely difficult to approach the group that is at risk to radicalisation. If this group had not asked to use the mosque, they would never have been found. Probably there are more such groups that operate from homes. If the mosques had a broader reach towards this kind of individuals and small groups, it would be easier to spot and support them.

**Phase III: Coping with radical individuals**

In the third phase that we distinguished, an individual has turned his back on Western society. This person is not just religiously conservative, but doesn't want to be part of Western society anymore. The biggest problem for local authorities is to find these individuals before they get to the violent stage. Amsterdam decided to set up a unit (called Information Household Radicalisation) located at a central department where professionals who thinks that individuals or groups are in the process of radicalisation can report this. A multidisciplinary team analyses the case, gives advice to the professional about possible interventions and contacts. Professionals from schools, youth work, police and city districts – who are trained to recognize radicalisation – can phone the *Information Household* for a report or advice. The office is part of the department of public order and safety. The department has to function very carefully when it comes to privacy of individuals.

If a case of actual radicalisation is confirmed, the notifier gets advice to ask the cooperation of people that surround the group or individual. The example of the training showed that it is not always easy to convince someone to join activities. The cooperation of imam, school teachers, youth workers, parents, family members and anybody who could be important is asked. Parents are informed of what the views of their son or daughter could imply. Firstly the social problems are addressed: home, income, school, health, psychiatry. If possible he or she is provoked into discussions with a religious expert. During discussion – as with the Socratic discussions – the consequences of someone’s thinking are reasoned through just by asking questions to stimulate a process of critical thinking for instance: ‘would that mean that you would fight a war against your father?’, or ‘ would that mean that you would also kill your sister?’ or ‘ and do you think you are a good Muslim when you do this?’ The *Information Household* estimates that there are not more than 8 or 10 cases per year to whom this most extreme interference applies. One has to realise that the chance to find a psychiatric problem among this extreme group is considerable.

**Phase IV: Dealing with Terrorism**
The phase completely on the right side of the model, is violent and terrorist behaviour. This is usually not taken as the responsibility of local administration. Policy makers reserve these issues for the police or secret service. But we found in the CLIP cities examples of cooperation between social workers, educational workers and even mosque officials and the police.

The cities with no active policy to deal with radicalisation

Breda and Terrassa both focus on general policies, the first one from a diversity viewpoint and the second starting from social cohesion.

5. Conclusion

In this paper we have firstly tried to evaluate the discussion on how the process of radicalisation can be presented in steps. The steps we have distinguished made it possible to who what see for each of them what kind of policy interventions were possible. We have presented policies that we saw in several European cities. After having seen several examples, a few think are striking.

Firstly it strikes us that the policies in cities with an explicit anti radicalisation policy are not at all that different from the policies in cities that don’t have these kind of explicit policies. In the case of Terrassa for instance, most policies were carried out under the heading ‘Conviviencia’ which includes peacefully living together and sharing values, sharing a common idea about society, having similar ideas about the use of public space and a kind of public identity. The policies executed in Terrassa were actually quit similar to the policies to diminish the breeding ground of radicalisation in Amsterdam. The same was also that reacting on actual violent behaviour was left to the police.

The differences between cities that have and do not have an de–radicalisation policies seems to lie in their involvement with religion itself. Where this is seen as impossible in Terrassa and not desirable in Breda. In Amsterdam and Kirklees there is a tendency to think that it is possible. The staff of the municipality of Amsterdam has even written policy papers on this issue, to be able to work together with religious leaders on religious interpretations. Obviously the problem of not strictly sticking to the division of church and state is an issue that here.

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