

African immigrants in the Netherlands

Anja van Heelsum¹

The largest African communities in the Netherlands coming from countries south of the Sahara were on January 1st, 2005 Somalis (21.670), Cape Verdians (19.919), Ghanaians (18.927), Angolans (11.584), Ethiopians/Eritreans (10.233/ 765), DR Congolese (8.275), Nigerians (7.484) and Sudanese (7.218).² In total we are talking about more than 100.000 people.

The Dutch ministry of Justice has published a series on new ethnic groups, of which the first one was on Somalis (Hessels, 2000), the second one on Ghanaians (Choenni, 2002) the third on Cape Verdians (Choenni, 2004). In 2006 a similar publication appeared on several other African groups together, namely Angolans, Ethiopians/Eritreans, DR Congolese, Nigerians and Sudanese (Van Heelsum & Hessels, 2005). This article is based on this common publication. Information on Somalis has been added. Because there is not much quantitative research available Van Heelsum and Hessels used focus groups as one of the research methods. When quantitative data were available, it is used in the description below. When this was lacking, the information is based on the focus groups.

Box: Political history of Angola

Angola became independent from Portugal in 1975. The colonisation and the slave trade had already started 1648 and disrupted Angolan society for longer period than in other countries. Portuguese influence can be found in language, habits and music and there is relatively a lot of cultural exchange with other Lusophone countries like Brazil and Cape Verde. After it's independence Angola became involved in the cold war: South Africa and the U.S. and MPLA by the Soviet Union and Cuba supported UNITA. A complicating factor was that the diamond trade financed the war. After 16 years of fighting, and 300.000 casualties, elections became possible in 1991. However, UNITA did not accept the outcomes of the elections. Only after UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi died in a gun battle with government troops in February 2002, a lasting peace became a realistic prospect. After 27 years of conflict the country is faced with the difficult task to rebuild the devastated infrastructure and to supply housing for the ten thousands of homeless and refugees.

Box: Political history of DR Congo

The inlands of Congo are impenetrable forests that have not been intruded by Europeans for a long time. But from 1879 onwards, Belgium took control of the enormous territory. In 1960 the country obtained independence. Since then a chaotic civil war developed. Causes are among others the richness in natural resources, the lack of central authority and the involvement of the neighbouring countries in gold and diamond mining and ethnic conflicts for instance between Hutu's and Tutsi's in the East. The war of the last 15 years has cost according to the estimates of human rights associations 2.5 million victims, and can be considered as one of the largest tragedies in recent African history (Berwouts, 2001).

Box: Political history of Ethiopia/Eritrea

Ethiopia is an old African empire that has never been colonised. Eritrea was initially part of the empire of Aksum, but was ruled from 1890 until 1941 by the Italians. After the second world war, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia, but an independence movement developed, that conquered the capital Asmara in 1991. After that independence followed. One of the worst periods in the recent Ethiopian history after the second world war was the period between 1977-1978 called 'Red Terror'. During the 'Dergue' regime, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, killings and disappearances were common (Wolde Giorgis, 1989). Thereupon the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia caused a lot of unrest again. In the last 10 years the freedom of speech has improved in Ethiopia, but regular draughts and corruption are a problem. Remigration to Ethiopia is carefully starting. The political

¹ Dr. A. van Heelsum is researcher at the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies of the University of Amsterdam. This article is based on the publication of Van Heelsum & Hessels (2005).

² Persons who were born in the Eritrean territory before Eritrea's independence, are registered as Ethiopians. It is estimated that about half of the Ethiopian population in the Netherlands is actually of Eritrean descent. This is why it is often better to add Ethiopians and Eritreans together.

situation in Eritrea is under Isajas Afeworki less favourable, repression of the opposition and torture of prisoners are causes of the ongoing refugee movement out of Eritrea. In June 2005 the political situation in Ethiopia destabilised: due to the outcomes of the elections, clashes between supporters of the opposition and government forces caused at least 22 casualties.

Box: Political history of Nigeria

Nigeria has the highest population density of Africa and has 124 million inhabitants. It was colonised by the British from 1861 to 1960. Nigeria hosts a variety of ethnic groups: Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo are the three largest. In spite of explicit statements of president Obasanjo against ethnically based militias that preach separatism, ethnic contradictions tend to revive. In 1995 disorder (re) developed in Ogoniland after the execution of Ogoni-leader Ken Saro Wiwa, who was campaigning against the damage caused by the oil industry. The main dividing line in the country runs between the Islamite North and the Christian South. Conflicts between Muslim and Christians have in the recent past often led to bloodshed. The introduction of the sharia in 12 Northern states for instance instigated protests among Christians (Van der Aa, 2002).

Box: Political history of Sudan

The war between the government in Khartoum and the rebels in the South, but also the relationship between the government and populations groups in the East and the West cause over and over again clashes. This is not also about contradictions between the Islamic Northern and the Christian Southern part of the country. Problems can simply start with cattle looting between ethnic groups, an ages old phenomenon in South and West that deteriorates because of the use of modern weapons. The choice of the government for Muslim radicalism complicates the situation further (Van Beurden, 1994). Both neighbouring countries and the U.S. have supported the resistance for many years. On January 9th 2005 the Sudanese government and SPLA leader John Garang signed a piece agreement, which gives hope for a better future for South-Sudan. A new phase of the history of Sudan has herewith started. The death of the newly installed vice-president Garang in a helicopter crash has not reversed this. In the Western part of the country though, in the Darfur region, violence between 2004 and 2006 only deteriorated (BBC, 2005; Vasagar, 2004).

Box: Political history of Somalia

Somalia is a country with a functioning central government or governmental institutions since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. The Northern part has declared itself unilaterally independent, calling itself Somaliland. Fighting between competing military clan leaders (warlords) and the chaotic situation that followed accompanied with hunger and disease, have led to one million deaths. The current Somalia has been merged in 1960 from the former British protectorate and the Italian colony. In 1963 Somalia claimed the territories in Kenya where ethnic Somalis live and in 1964 and 1977 these territories in Ethiopia. The military interference by the U.S. "Restore Hope" in 1992 became a disaster. The constant unrest has slowed down all economic and social development of the country.

Demographic data

The African groups in this study count between 7.626 and 21.6331 persons. In all cases the percentage of men is higher than the percentage of women, as is usual among new immigrant groups. In 1996 the ratio was still extremely skewed, but in the course of the years the percentage of women is increasing among all groups. As presented in table 1, none of the groups in this study has reached a fifty-fifty ratio. The ratio is most skewed among Angolans and Sudanese.

Table 1 Seven African groups: number of women/men and first/ second generation on January 1st 2005

	Angolans	Congolese	Ethio./Eritr.	Nigerians	Sudanese	Somalis
women	4.769 (41%)	3.918 (47%)	4.717/391 (46%)	3.327 (44%)	2.449 (34%)	10.107 (47 %)
men	6.832 (59%)	4.419 (53%)	5.575/403 (54%)	4.288 (56%)	4.836 (66%)	11.626 (53 %)

first generation	9.285 (80%)	5.469 (66%)	7.147 /645 (70%)	4.426 (58%)	5.798 (80%)	15.083 (69 %)
second generation	2.316 (20%)	2.868 (34%)	3.145 /149 (30%)	3.189 (42%)	1.487 (20%)	6.650 (31 %)
total (100%)	11.601	8.337	10.292 /794	7.615	7.285	21.733

Nigerians have the highest percentage of Dutch born kids of all groups (42%). Angolans and Sudanese have relatively few kids who are born in the Netherlands (20%). This is caused by their later arrival in the Netherlands. The age distribution of the groups also differs. Among Angolans we find relatively many single youngsters. Specific for the situation of the Angolans is the high number of single minor asylum seekers. One of the reasons why boys flee is their fear to get recruited for the army. In 1998 62% of the asylum seekers was younger than 18, in 2000 70%, in 2003 62%. Of these youngsters little more than half is younger than 15; the others are 15-17 years old. Of the total Angolan population in the Netherlands, 62% is younger than twenty, while among Ethiopians/Eritreans only 38% is younger than 20 and among Congolese 48%. The mean age, at which Angolan girls give birth, is also younger than among the other African women in this research.

In table 2 the type of household is shown for the six ethnic groups in this study. The highest percentage of singles is found among Sudanese (39%), which is directly related to the high percentage of men. Family reunion process of Sudanese with partners that are still abroad is not completed. The percentage of married people varies from 8% among Angolans to 19% among Nigerians. This figure on Nigerians is not surprising, since Nigerians arrive often as marriage partners of someone who already lives in the Netherlands. Sudanese are also relatively often married (18%). Single parent families occur most among Somalis and Ethiopians/Eritreans (respectively 10 and 9%).

Table 2 Type of household of sex African groups on January 1st, 2004

type of household	Angolans	Congolese	Ethio+Eritr	Nigerians	Soedanese	Somalis
Child within a family	3.972 (32%)	3.634 (43%)	3.887 (36%)	3.207 (44%)	2.032 (27%)	11.122 (45%)
Single	3.985 (33%)	1.800 (21%)	3.096 (28%)	1.353 (19%)	2.940 (39%)	5.499 (22%)
Cohabiting, no children	591 (5%)	365 (4%)	496 (5%)	400 (5%)	336 (4%)	848 (3%)
Married, no children	95 (1%)	178 (2%)	403 (4%)	282 (4%)	222 (3%)	374 (2%)
Not married, children	589 (5%)	413 (5%)	318 (3%)	376 (5%)	173 (2%)	631 (3%)
Married, with children	820 (7%)	1.060 (13%)	1.169 (11%)	1.095 (15%)	1.169 (15%)	2.218 (9%)
Parent (in single parent family)	937 (8%)	630 (7%)	948 (9%)	285 (4%)	293 (4%)	2.550 (10%)
Other household member	916 (8%)	285 (3%)	519 (5%)	232 (3%)	373 (5%)	1.460 (6%)
In institutional family	376 (3%)	126 (2%)	122 (1%)	68 (1%)	88 (1%)	299 (1%)
Total (100%)	12.281	8.490	10.948	7.298	7.626	25.001

(source: CBS, Statline 2005)

Angolans, Congolese and Sudanese are more dispersed through the Netherlands than Ethiopians/Eritreans and Nigerians. This can be explained by the housing policy of asylum seekers after they receive the refugee status throughout the country. Ethiopians/Eritreans and Nigerians are more often

found in the big cities and so called 'randstad' (area between Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht). Ethiopians have stayed relatively longer in the Netherlands, and the Nigerian choice for cities is caused by the high percentage immigrants that come to marry. Among Somalis we notice a tendency to be more mobile than other groups, but among all groups there is a tendency to move on to the 'randstad'. The reasons are, firstly that more fellow countrymen are found in the cities, but also the specific facilities and the employment possibilities. This pattern over movement will probably continue in the future.

Migration motifs and history

Looking at their migration history, the groups of this study can be divided into the groups that mainly arrived as asylum seekers (Angolans, Congolese, Sudanese en Somalis) and the groups that had mixed motifs for migration (Ethiopians en Nigerians). As table 3 shows, the variety of migration motifs is clearest among Nigerians.

Table 3 Immigration motifs of six African groups in 2003

	Angolans	Congolese	Ethio+Eritr	Nigerians	Sudanese	Somalis
Labour	67 (6%)	7 (2%)	14 (4%)	87 (17%)	4 (1%)	5 (1%)
Asylum	1.014 (87%)	295 (75%)	127 (33%)	129 (25%)	274 (70%)	215 (63 %)
Family reunion	52 (4%)	55 (14%)	13 (3%)	45 (9%)	44 (11%)	88 (26 %)
Family member	4 (0%)	5 (1%)	2 (1%)	23 (5%)	-	1 (0 %)
Family formation	4 (0%)	18 (5%)	52 (14%)	171 (33%)	63 (16%)	35 (10 %)
Study	4 (0%)	-	89 (23%)	39 (8%)	4 (1%)	1 (0 %)
Other	16 (1%)	11 (3%)	51 (13%)	19 (4%)	2 (0%)	1 (0 %)
Total (100%)	1.165	392	384	514	389	344

(Source: CBS, Statline 2005 + an addition through CBS info service)

The most common motif to migrate among Nigerians is family formation (33%), which means that Nigerians often marry with a partner who already has Dutch nationality. After the asylum motif labour is a relatively important ground to move to the Netherlands, more than among any of the other enumerated groups.

Among the Ethiopians study is the most important reason to migrate after asylum. A quarter of the Ethiopians arrive in the Netherlands to study. This is most noticeable at the Agricultural University of Wageningen and at the Institute for Social Studies in Den Haag.

The third row of the table shows that family reunification takes place among Somalis and to a lesser extend among Congolese and Sudanese. This means that the percentage of single men will diminish in the future, while the percentage of complete families will increase. The migration motif is of great importance for someone's future in the Netherlands. I already noted that asylum seekers are more spread throughout the country. I will go in to the consequences for the labour career later.

The chances of Angolans, Ethiopians en Nigerians to qualify for a refugee status are under the present circumstances not favourable. The political situation in these countries is relatively safe, though this can change any moment as became clear after the Ethiopian elections last year. Refugees from Eritrea, Sudan and DR Congo have been refused as refugees in big numbers, but their chances to achieve the refugee status in the Netherlands are better than the first mentioned.

When leaving the Netherlands, some emigrants leave to their county of birth and others to a third country. As a rule students go back to their country of origin. The 89 Ethiopian and 39 Nigerian students who arrived in 2003 have largely returned to their country of origin. Table 4 shows the emigration from the Netherlands. Somalis are the largest group that leave the Netherlands, often to

third countries. Their through migration to the United Kingdom has been described by other authors (Muus & Muller, 1999; Van Reek & Afework, 2003).

Table 4 Emigration from the Netherlands of seven African groups in 1996, 2000 and 2004

	Angolans	Congolese	Ethiopians	Eritreans	Nigerians	Sudanese	Somalis
1996	30	63	89	5	120	19	129
2000	21	27	111	5	87	24	986
2004	152	101	160	1	111	132	1760

Source: CBS Statline 2005

A portion of the labour migrants (and the asylum seekers that have received a refugee status) will after years return to their country of origin, but there is also a considerable group that migrates further to countries where perspectives to find work are better. Of the 87 Nigerian immigrants that came to work in the Netherlands, some are temporary in the Netherlands, for instance to work for international companies like Shell; these temporary immigrants will either go further or back to Nigeria.

Remigration of Congolese is very problematic, not only because of the unsafe situation in Eastern Congo, but also because of the lack of cooperation of the Congolese authorities. The Congolese are orientated towards Belgium and France, but there are no figures available on their target country in Europe. The Angolans who have voluntarily not returned to Angola in 2004 were mainly unaccompanied single minors. A small portion left to Portugal.

Integration

Indicators to measure integration are both quantitative and qualitative. Firstly qualitative measures in the sector labour/income and education will be treated, and secondly quantitative indicators, summarized under the heading of the socio-cultural position.

Labour and income

There are not a lot of quantitative data available on the labour market position and the income of Africans. Van Rijn e.o. (2004) compare the labour participation of a number of immigrant groups, among which Nigerians and Sudanese. Unfortunately Angolans, Ethiopians and Congolese are not part of that study. In table 5 is the percentage of working is presented of all 15-60 year olds that arrived between September 1998 and September 1999 in the Netherlands. In the course of four years one can see how the portion of working people increases, after staying longer in the country. For comparison information on Turkish, Ghanaian and Iraqi immigrants is also presented.

Table 5 Proportion of working immigrants (15-60 year old) of those who immigrated between Sept 1998 to Sept 1999, six immigrant groups

	1999	2000	2001	2002
Ghanaians	32,7	41,4	46,7	47,7
Iraqis	11,2	18,3	17,5	17,0
Nigerians	28,5	36,2	35,0	36,5
Sudanese	10,1	17,8	24,2	28,2
Somalis	6,8	12,7	14,8	17,7
Turks	27,3	42,1	45,3	46,5

(re calculated from Van Rijn, e.a. (2004)

Table 5 shows that most immigrants from the asylum seeker groups - Iraqis, Sudanese and Somalis - did not find work in the first year (6-10% found work). Among the immigrants from non-asylum seeker groups - Ghanezen, Nigerians and Turks - this percentage is considerably higher (27-33%). This shows that the speed to join the labour process is highly related to the migration motif. For ethnic groups that mainly consist of former asylum seekers, the entry to the labour market proceeds much slower. They are at first instance less oriented towards the Dutch labour market and do not always have the required qualifications. Furthermore their entry to the labour market becomes more

problematic when the asylum procedure has lasted very long and in the case that people suffer from trauma related to their war and flight experience.

Among the three asylum seeker groups we see an up going trend in labour participation through the years. The percentage of working Sudanese after four years is strikingly higher (28,2%) than the percentage of other refugee groups like Somalis (17,7%) and Iraqis (17,0%). Labour participation of Sudanese increases from 10,1% in 1999 to 28,2% in 2002. The relatively high mean education cannot explain the difference completely. A second explanation can be that Sudanese are more committed to accept jobs. In our focus group meetings, Sudanese describe their work ethos as very committed. The percentage of Sudanese on welfare is only 20% after 4 years. Compared to this, Somalis are less successful. The percentage of working Somalis is only 18% after four years.

As expected Nigerians start with a considerably higher percentage working, but this only increases further in the second year and not after that. The focus group discussions have shown a lot of frustration about the Dutch labour market. Apparently it is difficult for Nigerians to find a stable place on the Dutch labour market.

Education

Representative figures on the educational level are not available for all the groups in this study. Data on the educational level of asylum seekers exist, and we will use them here as an indicator of the educational level of the whole group, based on a study by Warmerdam & Van den Tillaart (2002). As I already made clear, asylum seekers are just a portion of the total African population.

Table 6 Educational level of asylum seekers who were at their arrival 16 years or older (in percentages).

	Angolans	Congo- lese	Ethio- pians	Eritre- ans	Nige- rians	Soeda- nese	Somalis
max 5 years primary education	26.5	7.8	9.4	17.6	19.2	23.6	42.1
primary/second ary lower education	43.0	28.3	32.3	45.9	20.7	25.9	32.7
secondary intermediate	24.3	45.4	44.2	28.4	35.1	20.3	19.9
higher (college, university)	6.0	18.5	14.1	8.1	25.0	30.2	5.3
total (n)	2.200	1.033	511	320	735	3.915	6.311

Source: (Warmerdam, 2002) p. 184

As table 6 shows, Sudanese are higher educated than other groups: the percentage of asylum seekers with college/university education is 30.2%. Between 1995 and 2000 33 doctors, 32 jurists and 36 engineers from the Sudan asked for asylum in the Netherlands. Successively we find Nigerians with 25% of college/university education and Congolese with 18.5% and Ethiopians with 14.1%. Among Somalis there are relatively more people with lower educational level (42.1% has maximum five years of primary school). This is not surprising, since the school system in Somalia has not functioned after the fall of Barre in 1991, which has resulted in a generation that has never been to school at all. Somali asylum seekers have the most alarming educational position of the groups treated here.

More detailed information on education on Ethiopians/Eritreans and Somalis is available from the study of Van den Tillaart e.a. (2000). Little more than half of the Ethiopians/Eritreans interviewed by Van den Tillaart went on with some kind of schooling in the Netherlands. Among Somalis this percentage is lower (39%). About 80% of Ethiopians takes language training, but due to policy changes in the course of the years, there are differences in the number of months or years that immigrants could follow language training. More Somalis are taking language training (92%), because this has become obligatory in the mean while. 56% of Ethiopians takes a course that is targeted at a specific job, while 40% of Somalis does so. Somalis don't seem to catch up in the Netherlands with the educational arrears that they contracted in Somali.

About Sudanese there is a small scare study available by South Sudanese Women's Network (SSWAN), which covers 50 women. All these women prove relatively highly educated. Although Sudan is a country, where girls have less chances to follow (higher) education than boys, 20% of the interviewed ladies have some kind of education between 'college' (to become a teacher) and university. Our focus group discussion showed that the Sudanese men, that we have met were even higher educated.

We found additional information on Angolans in a small study of the Dutch branch of the International Organisation for Migration (Brons & Schaap, 2002). Brons & Schaap interviewed 43 Angolans, who had lived between 1 and 12 years in the Netherlands. Four of these respondents had a permanent staying permit or a Dutch passport. The others had a temporary status as a single unaccompanied minor or were grown ups waiting for the outcome of the asylum procedure. The respondents were relatively young and low educated. Most of them could only read and write on a very basic level. It is evident that the war situation in Angola has blocked access to school for many youngsters. In the Netherlands these unaccompanied minors have to go to school, but that means that they first have to acquire the necessary language level to develop themselves with respect to content. In most cases lower vocational training is the highest level they can reach. The boys find it most important to obtain a diploma, not only as an investment in the Netherlands but also to improve their chances on the Angolan labour market after returning there.

Social cultural position

Our focus group discussions show that the participants experience a considerable distance between the various African cultures and the Dutch culture. This begin with the Dutch language, which is considered very difficult. According to the participants in our focus group meetings it is impossible to learn Dutch at a reasonable level in the short newcomer course, supplied by the Dutch government. Nigerians, Sudanese and Ethiopians can fall back on English, but French speaking Congolese and Portuguese speaking Angolans cannot communicate in these languages with many people in the Netherlands. Unfortunately this has not lead to a faster learning of Dutch, but to more isolation. 62% of the Somalis think that their Dutch is between bad and fair. In our meetings Congolese had most problems with the Dutch language.

Cultural differences show in several different fields. Generally Muslims (among the Somalis, Sudanese and Nigerians) have stricter rules concerning contact between men and women. Furthermore, most Africans are used to more public spirit and sense of community than is usual in the Netherlands, and many feel easily lonely. Another important difference that is often addressed during discussions is the way children are raised. Some Dutch kids wear expensive cloths, celebrate their birthdays with presents and have according to African norms not much respect for grown ups or elderly. Children have to behave differently at school than at home and feel treated badly compared to their peers. When the marriageable age of Muslim girls approaches, contact with boys becomes an issue. Parents need to find reasonable compromises, and explain their choices, when raising their kids with some African habits in the Netherlands.

Most participants in our focus group meetings were contented with the social relations that they had with for instance neighbours. Many of them had acquired Dutch friends. But Dutch institutions were considered more difficult to approach, in particular the Immigration Service (IND) and the Labour Office (CWI) were considered not helpful. The harsher political climate toward immigration in general and Muslims in particular is experienced as very unpleasant. Several participants in our focus group meetings expressed discontent with the health care system. Misunderstandings occur about the use of medicine. And serious problem sometimes occurs when the risks of childbirth at home among women that have been circumcised are underestimated.

Many informants criticize the Dutch school system. Particularly the CITO-test is the target of protest. This test for 12-year old, determines the secondary school level, and is because of that decisive for the future of the kids. Children that do not know the language so well, are often send to lower educational levels than children that know the language.

A problem that we see among Somalis, Congolese and Angolans is that the criminality figure of boys between 15-25 years old is higher than among other ethnic groups (Kromhout & Van San, 2003). These

authors connect this to the decline of moral standards in these countries of origin. Sudanese youngsters nearly don't show up in these statistics.

Organisations

A comparison in table 7 shows big differences in the number of associations and the organisational density (that is the number of associations per 1000 inhabitants). Somalis, Ethiopians and Eritreans dispose of much more associations than for instance Angolans.

Table 7 Number of organisations and organisational density of African groups in 2004

	number of organisations	organisation per 1000 inhabitants
Angolans	12	1
Congolese	37	4
Ethiopians/Eritreans	114	11
Nigerians	21	3
Sudanese	43	6
Somalis	161	6

A factor that is often used to explain the large number of Somali associations is the clan structure of the Somali community. Somalis have relatively many aid organisations, that support an area or a village in Somalia, for instance to build a school or a well in a village. Family and stay-behinds in Somalia sometimes don't have any source of income and in the worst period of the ware, there were not even banks or telephone companies. Helping the stay behinds in this totally destroyed country was very urgent (Van Heelsum, 2004, p. 51).

Among Ethiopians, Eritreans and Congolese the most common form of organisation is the religious one. Besides specifically Ethiopian Coptic churches and Congolese Kimbanguist churches, these communities have Roman Catholic and many Pentecostal churches.

A specific characteristic of Eritrean organisation is, that many are related to the Eritrean government. Before its independence Eritrea had a liberation movement (EPLF) and an opposition movement (ELF) which both had strong organisational networks in Europe. This exists after the Eritrean independence, in the first case allied to the embassy.

The Sudanese organisations are more divers: more political and aid organisations and less religious organisations. In 2004 30 associations have united in the so-called 'Sudan Civil Society Forum in the Netherlands' (abbreviated Sudan Forum). This Sudan Forum has been established because Dutch NGO's needed a contact point to work together.

Among the Nigerian organisations there are also platforms, but at least two, from different sections of the Nigerian population.

The fact that platforms develop shows that there are differences in the strength of the organisational networks in different migrant communities. Among Sudanese and Nigerians the networks are well developed and it is easy to get contact with these organisations, while the network of Angolans is relatively the least developed one. Probably the age of the young Angolan population is one of the causes. The database of Somali associations changes faster than among the other groups, both because of new formation/discontinuance as because of address change.

Conclusion and future perspective

The immigration of the African groups in this study to the Netherlands will continue in the near future. Firstly because conflicts in for instance Sudan en DR Congo are lasting, but also because of family reunification. The currently relatively young community will grow up and have children. On the other hand we noticed a migration movement out of the Netherlands. Nigerians, Sudanese and Somalis attempt to migrate to the United Kingdom after they have obtained their Dutch passports. In their perception the English language is easier, the labour market more accessible and there is less pressure to conform in the cultural and religious domain. Especially high-educated immigrants succeed to find suitable jobs on the British labour market.

After comparing the African groups in this study, we notice a dichotomy between refugees and non-refugees. The asylum procedure delays the entry to the Dutch language course and the entry to the labour market. Marriage migrants and economic migrants take the newcomer course immediately after arrival, while asylum seekers have to wait until they receive their refugee status, which often takes many years.

I conclude that the integration of the African groups in this study in the Dutch labour market is not working well. The unemployment is enormous and many people work below the level that suits their education. Only specifically designed programs for professionals on a higher level have some results to solve this problem (Van der Ree & Afework, 2002).

When the number of kids that are born in the Netherlands increases, we can expect that the differences that we have noticed between traditional child raising and the Dutch surrounding will show out more. The generation that has arrived at primary school age will then probably get into relatively low secondary education. The children that can follow Dutch primary school completely have better chances. Promising is that the high educated parents can support these kids with their schoolwork. Supporting children to cope with the two norm systems is also desirable.

Referenties

- BBC. (2005). Country Profiles. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/country_profiles/default.stm.
- Berwouts, K. (2001). *Congo: mensen, politiek, economie, cultuur, milieu (landenreeks)*. Amsterdam: KIT/Novib.
- Brons, M., C. Schaap. (2002). *Pilot project: prepared return, Phase I: profile analysis of Angolans in the Netherlands*. Den Haag: IOM.
- Choenni, C. (2002). *Ghanezen in Nederland, een profiel*. Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken.
- Choenni, C. (2004). *Kaapverdianen in Nederland, een profiel*. Den Haag: Ministerie van Justitie.
- Hessels, T. (2000). *Somaliërs in Nederland, een profiel*. Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken.
- Kromhout, M., & M. van San. (2003). *Schimmige werelden, nieuwe etnische groepen en jeugdcriminaliteit*. Den Haag: WODC.
- Muus, P. J. & P.H.A.M. Muller. (1999). *Beeldvorming onder (uitgeprocedeerde) asielzoekers en vluchtelingen over terugkeer- en migratiebeleid*. Utrecht: Ercomer.
- Van Beurden, J. (1994). *Ethiopië/Eritrea: mensen, politiek, economie, cultuur (landenreeks)*. Amsterdam: KIT/Novib.
- Van den Tillaart, H., M. Olde Monnikhof, S. van den Berg & J. Warmerdam. (2000). *Nieuwe etnische groepen, een onderzoek onder vluchtelingen en statushouders uit Afghanistan, Ethiopië en Eritrea, Iran, Somalië en Vietnam*. Nijmegen: ITS.
- Van der Aa, G. (2002). *Nigeria, mensen, politiek, economie, cultuur, milieu (landenreeks)*. Amsterdam: KIT/Novib.
- Van der Ree, D. & S. Afework. (2002). *Ambities ... en dan? Problemen en perspectieven van hoogopgeleide vluchtelingen bij het vinden van een aansluiting op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt*. Rotterdam: EUR.
- Van Heelsum, A. (2004). *Migrantenorganisaties in Nederland, deel 1, aantal en soort organisaties en ontwikkelingen*. Utrecht: FORUM.
- Van Heelsum, A. & T. Hessels. (2005). *Afrikanen in Nederland, een profiel*. Den Haag: Ministerie van Justitie.
- Van Reek, E. (2003). *Somaliërs op doorreis- Verhuisgedrag van Nederlandse Somaliërs naar Engeland*. Tilburg: Wetenschapswinkel Universiteit Tilburg.
- Van Rijn, A. S., A. Zorlu, R.V. Bijl & B.F.M. Bakker. (2004). *De ontwikkeling van een integratiekaart*. Den Haag: WODC/CBS.
- Vasagar, J. (2004). Rage finds an outlet in Sudan's rebel camps. *The Guardian*, p. 28 Sept 2004.
- Warmerdam, J., H. van den Tillaart. (2002). *Arbeidspotentieel en arbeidsmarktloopbanen van vluchtelingen en asielgerechtigden; een verkennend onderzoek naar ervaringen van nieuwkomers op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt*. Nijmegen: ITS.
- Wolde Giorgis, D. (1989). *Red Tears, War, Famine, and Revolution in Ethiopia*. Trenton NY: Red Sea Press.