

Ethnic identity of Turks and Moroccans in Western Europe: position acquisition and position allocation

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Abstract

In this paper I will argue that the study of ethnic identity of immigrants is incomplete without attention for the influence of the opinions of people from the receiving societies in which immigrants arrive in (i.e. position allocation). Immigrants incorporate these opinions or react against them and this influences the way in which they see themselves. Prejudice towards Muslims is rather common in Europe and this makes position allocation even more relevant. Based on the EURISLAM survey data gathered in 2011 among Turks and Moroccans in six European countries, I will show that a valid model of ethnic identification can be developed in which position acquisition and position allocation are both elements.

1 Introduction

The concept ethnic identity refers—according to an often-cited author in this field, the British psychologist Jean S. Phinney—to claims of a common ancestry one shares, at least a similar culture, race, religion, language, kinship or place of origin within the context of a group (Phinney 2003). She maintains that “ethnic identity is a dynamic, multidimensional construct that refers to one’s identity or sense of self as a member of an ethnic group” (2003: 63).

Ethnic identity is not very obvious for a person when everyone around him or her shares the same culture, but the awareness of it and its salience increases in the immigration context, since immigrants usually live in a country where they are not the majority group. Native inhabitants of countries with only one national group tend to think less about their ethnic identity than those in countries where more than one ethnic group reside, since in the latter there is more reason to think about specific ethnic group characteristics. What differentiates them? Is it culture, language, experience? Immigrants can choose to define themselves mainly in terms of their country of origin, but also in terms of the new country, or as usually happens, in both terms. But what is most important depends on a lot of factors.

As the above situation shows, ethnic identities are defined in relation to others. Decisions on how to define oneself are made by individuals but are strongly influenced by the opinions of those whom people consider part of their ‘own’ group—the in-group—as well as those whom they consider members of the out-group. The ethnic and religious identities of a person are some of the many social identities with which people define themselves in relation to their chosen group membership (Tajfel & Turner 1986). Boundary setting is part of determining where the difference between one’s in-group and the out-groups lies, as stated in one of the classics in the field, Frederik Barth’s *Ethnic groups and boundaries* (1969).

Most authors on this subject agree that ethnic identity formation is a dynamic process; the subjective belief of being part of a certain group with certain reasoning about the common origin, descent and history is determined by wider social and material circumstances, cultural meanings and historical conditions (Verkuyten 2005: 80). Just like identity in general, ethnic

identity should not be considered a stable characteristic, since it can be redefined when circumstances change. For instance, a Moroccan immigrant can arrive in the Netherlands as a not very religious young man, interested in work and the adventure of moving to a new country, but after having lived in the new context for 30 years, he might become more aware of the Muslim aspect of his roots and decide that this is a central aspect of his identity.

In some cases, cultural and religious elements are intertwined or might fight for prioritisation. This might be the case for the Muslim groups in this study. The question to what extent it is more important to identify as a national group or as a religious group or maybe as one of the religious denominations becomes relevant. In the case of Muslims in Western Europe, stigmatisation seems to have increased in the last ten years (Shadid & van Koningsveld 2002; Saeed 2007). Consequently, the attention of the ethnic groups in this study might have shifted into putting more emphasis on the religious aspect of their belonging—related to a more defensive attitude to defend their faith than was necessary in their country of origin.

In an earlier study that started in 1990 I have used instead of *ethnic identity* the concept of *ethno-cultural position*, introduced by Rinus Penninx (1988). The ethno-cultural position relates to defining oneself AND being defined as a member of a specific group. In addition to what Penninx calls position acquisition—i.e. the way in which people define themselves—an explicit element of his model is position allocation, i.e. the way in which *others* see them. The way in which people see themselves is on the one hand determined by views they develop independently or among in-group members, but in addition to this there are the positive and negative views that out-group members have that influence their thinking. In the migration context, stigmatisation of newcomers is rather common. Cultural differences are easily perceived as negative and sometimes even as threatening by members of the host society. Penninx argues that this element is so important that it should not be seen independently from the ethnic self-definition.

After my earlier study the idea that others influence the way in which people define their own ethnic identity has become more widely accepted. Authors such as Jenkins (2008), Rumbaut (2008) and Portes (2011) have used the concept *reactive ethnicity*. Rumbaut writes: “This process of forging a reactive ethnicity in the face of perceived threats, persecution, discrimination, and exclusion is not uncommon. It is one mode of ethnic identity formation that highlights the role of a hostile context of reception in accounting for the rise rather than the erosion of ethnicity” (Rumbaut 2008: 110). Therefore it is not necessary anymore to use the unknown concept ethno-cultural position, but it remains a point that position acquisition and position allocation are distinguished. I will present my own conceptualisation of ethnic identity, that includes these two elements.

Another relevant point is that the actual acceptance of immigrants or ethnic minorities by the host society might not be the same as the acceptance that immigrants perceive. A lack of perceived acceptance might lead to negative feelings and frustrations, and in some cases the negative image of the out-group becomes so important that it is internalised. This is a phenomenon that has been described for African Americans in the United States and colonial minorities in Europe. Whether this process has also become relevant for Muslims in Europe remains an open question. In this paper I will pay attention to both the actual acceptance as reported by members of the receiving society and the perceived acceptance as reported by immigrants.

The central issue in this paper is to configure and test a model of ethnic identification that includes both position acquisition and position allocation for two Muslim groups in Europe, namely Turks and Moroccans.


I will use data gathered in the EURISLAM project in 2011 concerning Turks and Moroccans in Europe (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Switzerland). In addition to survey data among Muslims and natives in six European countries, data were also gathered on claims concerning Muslims in the newspapers in these countries (for more details see Tillie et al forthcoming). Using both survey and newspaper data, I will test whether my conceptual model with position acquisition and position allocation makes sense.

2 Operationalization and method

For the current analysis, I have selected the 1,513 Moroccan respondents (about 250 per country) and 1,445 Turkish respondents from the EURISLAM dataset. My model of ethnic identity includes self-identification (position acquisition) and the influence of the opinions of others (position allocation). To operationalize position acquisition, I will use three variables: 1) identification with Morocco/Turkey, 2) identification with the country of settlement and 3) identification as a Muslim.

To operationalize position allocation I will use four variables: 4) the acceptance that immigrants perceive, and 5) the actual acceptance of immigrants, based on the answers of 2,314 respondents from the national majority group. The 6th and 7th indicators are drawn from the EURISLAM media data, namely the mean tone of the debate in every country and the mean tendency to generalise on Muslims in every country. The assumption is that the tone of the debate and the tendency to generalise in the newspapers are good indicators of the position allocation in a country. This means I have a more elaborate model and a higher number of indicators on position allocation than was the case in my earlier study. The relations between these indicators are graphically displayed in figure 1.

Figure 1 Operationalization of the ethnic identification



3 Results

I will now test the conceptual model using the EURISLAM data, interpreted as indicators to measure ethnic identity of Moroccans and Turks in Europe. First, I will discuss the results on three issues regarding self-definition (position acquisition) in section 3.1. In section 3.2, the opinions of others as seen by respondents in the survey will be presented (indicator of

position allocation), and in section 3.3 the mean opinions as presented in the media are discussed (indicator of position allocation). The internal consistency of the model and its indicators will be tested in section 3.4 to see whether our reasoning on position acquisition and position allocation holds.

3.1 Position acquisition: Ethnic and religious self-identification of Turks and Moroccans

As explained earlier, ethnic self-identification encompasses several elements that are at play at the same time: the element of the country of origin, the country of settlement and, in the case of Turks and Moroccans, the religious element. In the survey, three questions were asked that I will now consider: 1) To what extent do you see yourself as a member of the Moroccan/Turkish community? 2) To what extent do you identify with the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, UK, Belgium or France (respectively)? and 3) To what extent do you see yourself as a Muslim?

In table 1, I present the percentages of people who agree or strongly agree to these questions. The combined scores are calculated of those who strongly and very strongly agree with the statement: “To what extent do you see yourself as a member of the community?” (strongly agree, agree, somewhat, hardly, not at all).

Table 1 Identification of Turks and Moroccans with their country of origin, country of settlement and religious identification
(% of those who strongly + very strongly agree with the questions stated below)

		NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
1. To what extent do you see yourself as a member of the community of your country of origin?	Turks	71%	78%	73%	97%	89%	80%
	Moroccans	64%	60%	83%	81%	76%	83%
2. To what extent do you see yourself as Dutch, German, Swiss, British, Belgian or French?	Turks	50%	11%	35%	17%	25%	39%
	Moroccans	66%	45%	63%	33%	58%	43%
3. To what extent do you see yourself as a Muslim?	Turks	62%	70%	57%	42%	83%	69%
	Moroccans	71%	57%	74%	71%	73%	81%

As table 1 shows, the extent of identification with the Turkish community is in all cases considerably higher than the identification with the country of settlement. Those who identify strongly or very strongly with the Turkish community made up between 71% and 97%, while those who identify strongly or very strongly with the country of settlement make up 11% in Germany to maximum 50% in the Netherlands. Religious identification of Turks is usually in between these two.

For Moroccans, the extent of identification with the Moroccan community is in nearly all cases slightly higher than the identification with the country of settlement or the religious identification. Only in the Netherlands is there a slightly higher identification with the country of settlement (66 per cent) than with the Moroccan community (64 per cent).

3.2 Position allocation: How are immigrants seen by the majority and to what extent do they feel accepted?

After having seen how Turks and Moroccans in this study define themselves, I will now turn to the way they are seen by the majority and the extent to which they feel accepted. We first look at the actual acceptance by majority group members based on the survey and then at the perceived acceptance by Turks and Moroccans themselves, also based on the survey.

Respondents from the national majority group were asked to what extent they see immigrants who permanently live in the Netherlands, for instance, as Dutch. This question was not asked for Turks or Moroccans separately but for all immigrants. As table 2 shows, the replies given by the majority respondents in the six countries vary significantly, with respondents in the United Kingdom showing the least degree of acceptance of immigrants (9.4 per cent). Those in Germany, Belgium and Switzerland were in between, while the French and Dutch showed the most acceptance (France 59.4 per cent). Given the issues surrounding the wording of the questions in the UK (see note under table), we should be careful about concluding that there are serious discriminatory problems in the UK.

Table 2 Acceptance by the national majority and perceived acceptance by Turks and Moroccans (% of those who strongly + very strongly with the questions stated below)

		NL	DE	CH	UK **	BE	FR
National majority	‘To what extent do you see immigrants who permanently live in the Netherlands/ Germany/etc. ... as Dutch/German/etc ?’ *	56%	38%	46%	9%	36%	59%
Turks	‘To what extent do Dutch/ etc.... people see you as a Dutch/ etc. ... man or woman’.	51%	29%	54%	38%	22%	49%
Moroccans		38%	36%	55%	14%	43%	33%

* This question refers to all immigrants, and not only to Turks or Moroccans

** Note that the results may have been influenced by an unintended question wording effect. First, the term immigrants may have a different meaning in different countries—for instance in the UK, colonial minorities such as Pakistani are usually not considered immigrants. Second, the question ‘To what extent do English people see you as English’ might not include all UK citizens, which would suggest that all kinds of minority groups, including the Scots and the Welsh, are not part of the English.

The second row in the table shows the acceptance by the host society that Turks perceive. The acceptance that Turks perceive is usually lower than the actual acceptance, except in the UK. In Belgium and France the difference is 10% or more, in the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland less than 10%.

The third row shows how Moroccans perceive acceptance, which shows a similar pattern as we saw with acceptance of the majority group. The UK stands out with an exceptionally low perceived acceptance level (13.5 per cent). In between are (in increasing order) France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium and the highest acceptance level is found in Switzerland (55.1 per cent).

3.3 Position allocation: Muslims as seen in the newspapers

The second element of position allocation that might relate to perceived acceptance by the majority is the image of Muslims in the media. Media portrayal might be a factor that immigrants consider when talking about their ethnic identity. It is often stated that: a) Muslims are pictured negatively in the media, and b) that the differences that exist among them are ignored into a generalised picture that fits all (Vanparys et al., 2013).

The newspaper articles that were gathered by the EURISLAM team were coded in such a way that a score could be calculated to indicate how positive or negative the claims made about or by Muslims were. A score between -1 and +1 was given to each claim. By averaging the scores thus attributed across all claims, we obtained a raw yet helpful overall indicator of the discursive context in this field. The general indicator per country is presented in table 3.

Table 3 Mean position (positive/negative) of the claims on Muslims found in national newspapers

	Mean	Standard error	n
Netherlands	.23	.792	805
Germany	-.17	.951	769
Switzerland	.03	.888	775
United Kingdom	.23	.560	1141
Belgium	.09	.815	784
France	.26	.679	426

The first conclusion we can draw is that the mean score on this index is in general nearer to zero than to minus one or plus one. That indicates that, although there are a lot of positive and negative scores on each claim separately, overall there is a balance between the number of positive and negative claims. The six countries can be placed into three groups: 1) countries that offer a relatively open and “positive” context (France, the Netherlands and the UK), 2) countries that are more closed but still on the positive side (Belgium and Switzerland) and 3) countries with a particularly closed and “negative” context (Germany). Consequently, Muslims in different countries face very different discursive contexts, which might influence their ability to integrate socially, politically and culturally. In addition, positions are more polarised in certain countries than in others, as indicated by the standard errors. Specifically, claim-making in this field seems most polarised in Germany and least so in the UK and France, where a larger consensus seems to converge towards a positive stance vis-à-vis Muslims.

Now I will use the media data to find out whether Muslims are really treated as one single category as often as some authors assume. Analysing what the objects of the claim in the newspapers were, I can draw conclusions about the percentage of claims that address Muslims in general or Islam in general, without distinction or subgroups. As table 4 shows, in the Netherlands Muslims in general were mentioned in 34.9 per cent of the cases (upper two rows) and Islam in general 7.1 per cent, which together add up to 42 per cent of generalising statements. Specific statement were made in 12.6 per cent of the cases, where a minority or a small/particular group was addressed, and in 2 per cent of the cases a minority current in Islam was addressed, which together make up 14.6 per cent. This means that in more than half of the claims, actors in newspaper articles refer to Muslims as one category and do not

differentiate between radical Muslims and mainstream Muslims, for instance. The implication of speaking of Muslims as one category is that a stereotypical image of Muslims is presented in the newspapers and that the more liberal Muslims are often ignored.

Table 4: Objects of claims found in newspaper articles on Muslims (in percentages)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
Muslims as actors	60.4	89.9	78.1	63.8	79.4	41.0
All Muslims in general	32.3	12.6	42.3	26.5	23.8	22.0
Majority/most Muslims	2.6	1.7	1.5	1.4	3.1	1.1
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	12.6	50.1	14.4	18.3	36.7	6.8
Individual Muslims	11.4	22.2	18.4	15.1	15.3	8.3
Unclassifiable Muslims	1.5	3.3	1.5	2.5	.5	2.8
Islam as religion	10.5	7.6	14.6	2.9	8.9	18.4
Islam in general	7.0	2.3	11.9	2.0	7.6	10.2
Islam mainstream	.1	.1	.3	.0	.0	2.1
Minority currents within Islam	2.0	.0	1.0	.0	.2	1.1
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	.9	5.2	1.4	.8	.9	4.1
Unclassifiable Islam	.5	.0	.0	.1	.2	.9
No Muslim object	29.2	2.4	7.3	33.4	11.7	40.7
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	888	784	790	1173	812	469

The row with ‘minority/a small group/a particular categorical group of Muslims’ reveals that there were more of these specific claims in Germany and Belgium, while the opposite is true for the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and France. Talking about Islam in general compared to minority currents within Islam takes place more often in Switzerland and France than in the other countries.

3.4 The internal consistency of the model

To make the different types of data comparable for analysis in one model, I have added the newspaper variables per country to the survey data set: the indicator for the tone of the debate and the indicator for generalisation in the debate (this is the added percentage of codes on generalisation). This means that the data set on newspapers was added to the survey data set. Altogether, therefore, I have seven indicators in my model, as I suggested theoretically in figure 1. To find out how the indicators are related, I have calculated the correlations between these seven indicators in the same manner as I did in my 1997 study (Van Heelsum 1997: 112). The results on Moroccans are presented in table 5 and on Turks in table 6.

Table 5 Correlations between the seven variables for Moroccans

	1. id Morocco	2. id Eur	3. id Mus	4. accept	5. feelac	6. tone	7. general
1. id Morocco	1.000						
2. id Eur	**-.204	1.000					
3. id Mus	** .310	** -.132	1.000				
4. accept	** .111	-.017	.032	1.000			
5. feelac	-.080	** .317	** -.094	** -.106	1.000		
6. tone	** -.164	** .001	** -.195	** -.453	.060	1.000	
7. general	** -.096	.062	-.023	** .523	-.051	** -.546	1.000

1 = identification with Morocco; 2 = identification with the country of settlement
 3 = Muslim identification; 4 = acceptance score national majority per country
 5 = feeling of acceptance;
 6 = tone of debate, positive/negative mean score of the tone of articles per country
 7 = tendency to generalise in newspaper articles per country
*n is at least 1174, * p<.01 ** p<.001*

The correlation matrix of Moroccans shows a less clear-cut pattern than in my earlier study of second-generation Surinamese (Van Heelsum 1997: 114), where all indicators were positively correlated, including the experienced discrimination. In the current case, there are 14 significant correlations out of 21. Considering only the significant correlations, the table shows that those who identify more with Morocco also identify more as Muslims and in that case they identify less with their country of settlement. A positive identification with Morocco is correlated with a negative tone in the debate and more generalisations in the debate. That not all correlations are significant might mean that some indicators of ethnic identification do not fit so well.

Table 6 Correlations between the seven variables for Turks

	1. id Turkey	2. id Eur	3. id Mus	4. accept	5. feelac	6. tone	7. general
1. id Turkey	1.000						
2. id Eur	** -.191	1.000					
3. id Mus	** .285	** -.186	1.000				
4. accept	** .230	** .101	** -.172	1.000			
5. feelac	-.147	** .447	** -.138	-.044	1.000		
6. tone	-.041	** -.241	** .119	-.495	** -.143	1.000	
7. general	.012	** .127	.063	** .517	.035	** -.567	1.000

1 = identification with Turkey; 2 = identification with the country of settlement
 3 = Muslim identification; 4 = acceptance score national majority per country
 5 = feeling of acceptance;
 6 = tone of debate, positive/negative mean score of the tone of articles per country
 7 = tendency to generalise in newspaper articles per country
*n is at least 1421, * p<.01 ** p<.001*

Also in the Turkish case 14 indicators are significant out of 21, but not in all cases the same ones. In the case of the Turks the identification with the Turkish community is less influenced by the feeling of acceptance or the tone of the debate or generalisations in the newspapers than among Moroccans. The identification with the country of settlement though, is strongly related to these position allocation indicators.

Using once again the same method as in 1997 (Van Heelsum 1997: 113), I will now check with an exploratory factor analysis how much the indicators have in common, and

whether it makes sense to divide ethnic identification conceptually into two factors as I did in figure 1, namely position acquisition and position allocation. A factor analysis method searches for similar variance in the responses that could indicate an underlying latent variable. The outcomes for Moroccans are presented in table 7 and show that all indicators load in a three-factor model. Not a single indicator drops out, which means that they form a set—which was not visible in the correlations in table 5. Three main factors turn out behind the list of seven indicators, so there is one extra factor compared with the theoretical model. This combination of three factors explains 68 per cent of the variance, and the factor loadings on these factors are high (around .80), which is a good result meaning the model is valid.

Table 7 Scores of factor analysis for Moroccans (principal component analysis, varimax rotation)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
1.id Mor	-.014	.802	-.111
2.id Eur	.093	-.202	.771
3.id Mus	.072	.783	-.041
4.accept	.801	.018	-.086
5.feelac	-.111	.035	.834
6.tone	-.795	-.275	-.042
7.general.	.863	-.167	.029
<i>Explained variance</i>	29 %	20 %	19 %

The three high factor loadings on factor 1 for Moroccans are: acceptance by the majority population (+), tone of debate (-) and the tendency to generalise in the debate (+). So this first factor seems to represent a latent variable concerning the opinions of others (position allocation), namely dominant views in the societies in which Muslims live. Factor 2 seems to be the position acquisition factor: indicators that load high on the second factor are identification with Morocco (+) and identification as Muslim (+). Factor 3 is a combination of the identification as a member of the country of settlement (+) and the feeling of acceptance (+). One could maybe call this the relation with the country of settlement.

In table 8 the same calculation is made for Turks. As the table shows, the three factors in the model are similar for Turks and Moroccans but the second and the third factor have exchanged order due to the percentage of explained variance. The explained variance of position acquisition factor is one per cent higher among Moroccans than among Turks, and the country of settlement factor is two per cent higher for Turks than for Moroccans.

Table 8 Scores of factor analysis for Turks (principal component analysis, varimax rotation)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
1.id Turk	.159	-.140	.799
2.id Eur	.200	.794	-.165
3.id Mus	-.172	-.057	.798
4.accept	.834	-.044	.038
5.feelac	-.047	.875	-.048
6.tone	-.799	-.216	.019
7.general	.820	.028	-.049
<i>Explained variance</i>	30%	21%	19%

Again the first factor for Turks is the actual acceptance (+), tone of the newspaper debate (-) and generalisations in the newspapers (+). The second factor is (just as the third one for Moroccans identification with the country of settlement, which is strongly related to feeling of acceptance (+). And the third factor is similar to the second one earlier, and includes the identification with the Turkish community (+) and Muslim identification (+).

In figure 2, these results are presented in a graphic manner and I have reconstructed the model that I had earlier suggested (figure 1), taking into account the three factors that appeared in the factor analysis. It was not necessary to make separate models for Turks and Moroccans, since the conceptual division is the same.




Figure 2 New model of ethnic identification for Turks (T) and Moroccans (M)

The figure firstly shows the similarity between the Turkish and Moroccan respondents. Identification with their own communities and identification with the country of settlement are conceptually not part of the same factor. I expected respondents' identification with the country of settlement to be part of self-identification (position acquisition), and the perceived acceptance to be part of the second factor—i.e., opinions of others (position allocation). The relation with the country of settlement—though correlated with identification with the Turkish and Moroccan community and the identification as Muslim—seems conceptually part of a separate third factor together with perceived acceptance. This means that the earlier

model, used in 1997 for second-generation Surinamese, does not exactly fit the case of Turkish and Moroccan respondents in the EURISLAM survey and needs adjustment.

4 Conclusion and discussion

In this paper I have tested a new operationalization of a model of ethnic identification including self-identification (position acquisition) and opinions of others (position allocation) as main elements, using a large data set with survey results among Turkish and Moroccan respondents in six European countries. The two main factors of the model—position acquisition and position allocation—turned out to be relevant, but the identification with the country of settlement is a third factor in the model and this is highly related to the feeling of acceptance. This conceptual model of ethnic identification is effective for both Turks and Moroccans. That position allocation—the influence of the opinion of others—is highly relevant to include is probably due to the current climate of prejudice towards Muslims. The survey took place in 2011 when prejudices and negative attitudes towards immigrants and particularly towards Muslims were rather common all over Europe. Anti-Islamic viewpoints had become common in the political debate by then.

It seems that these negative attitudes had the effect of disconnecting Moroccan and Turkish attitudes towards their country of settlement from their self-identification. It seems contradictory that there is a strong tendency in most European countries to stress that immigrants should engage in effort to integrate into the host society, while actually their identification with the country of settlement depends a lot on their feelings of acceptance by the hosts. In other words, if native Europeans want immigrants to be integrated, they should make them feel accepted.

It is remarkable in our study that Turks and Moroccans do not differ very much. Most other studies that look into ethnic identification of Turks and Moroccan immigrants in Western Europe find a stronger tendency among Turks to identify with their own ethnic group than among Moroccans. Turks are well known for their pride about their own culture and their nationalism, which is less the case for Moroccans. That this difference is not as strong in the current study, might indicate that Turks and Moroccans start to look more alike, which might be due to being seen as Muslims by others. That the receiving societies are so particular about the Muslim part of their identity seems to have the effect that national identity is pushed to the background.

A possibility that remains to be explored is how differences between the first and second generation could play through these results, since Turkish and Moroccan first generation might be more oriented towards their national identity while the second generation of both groups might be more oriented towards a general Muslim identity.

I end with the conclusion that researchers who study ethnic identification should take the influence of the opinions of the receiving society into account in their conceptual model to be able to grasp people's consideration when forming their ethnic identity.

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